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Rules control power, assumed the signers of the  GATT rules mean.  Gatt's rules do not put limits
Punte del Este declaration, so elaborating and  on national practices, but provide international
extending GATT rules would move the interna-  sanction for these practice  Such rules are not
tional community toward a fairer, more stable  part of the solution but are part of the problem.
international trading system.
Theirs is a situation-specific argument, say
Finger and Dhar contend that the opposite is  Finger and Dhar, not a generic one.  Their target
true.  Particularly in the 1980s, the elaboration  is not "rules," nor is it "GATT." Rather, it is the
and application of GATT rules has been an  GATT rules.
The Policy Research Working Paper Series disseminates thc findings of work under way in the Bank. An objective of the scries
is to gct thcse findings out quickly. even if presentations are less than fully polished. The findings, interpretations, and
conclusions in these papers do:  ot necessarily represent official Bank policy
Produced by the Policy Research Dissemination CentcrDO RULES  CONTROL  POWER?
GATT  ARTICLES  AND  ARRANGEMIENTS  IN  THE  URUGUAY  ROUND
by
J.  Michael  Finger
and
Sumana  Dhar
I:  THE LOGIC OF THE IDEALIZED GATT  . ..  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Minimizing  government  interventions  ...  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 3
Power diplomacy versus rules diplomacy  . . . . . . . . . 5
II. THE EVOLUTION AND SIGNIFICANCE OF THE GATT RULES  . . . . . . . . . . 8
An example: the evolution of the antidumping rules  . . . . . . . . 11
The Kennedy Round antidumping code  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 11
Power  politics:  national . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 14
Power  politics: international . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 15
The ascendance of trade remedies  .....  . . . . .....  . ..  . 17
III.  WHERE THE GATT RULES GO WRONG  .....  . . . . . . . . . . .. . . 17
The devil is in the details . ......  . . . . ...  ...  . 17
The underlying economics encourages autarchy  . . . . . . . . . . . 19
Shameful  legal  princlples  .galprin.cip...es...  .......  20
The  flaws  are  synergistic ....  . . . . . . . ......  . . . . 21
IV. GATT ARTICLES AND AGREEMENTS IN THE URUGUAY ROUND . . . . . . . . . . 22
Controlling antidumping is the key issue  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 23
An academic issue: Safeguards.  . . . . . . . . . ...  . . . ....  24
The Uruguay Round antidumping proposals . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 25
Would anything change?  . . . .........  .....  . 27
Can anything be agreed? ....  . . . . . . . . . . . ......  . 29
V. CONCLUSIONS  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 31VI. REFORM  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 32
Get antidumping under control . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 33
The  source  of political  will  ......  . ..  . ..........  . 33
A suggestion for change . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 35
Ask the right question  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
Get the economics right . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 36
The technicalities of the suggestion  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 37
Not a retrofit to present practice  . . . . . . . . . . . . . 38
National  economic  interest  in  U.S. trade  law  . . . . . . . . 39
Public interest provision in Canadian law . . . . . . . . . . 40
The protection balance sheet of the Leutwiler Report  . . . . 40
A momentum against restriction  . . . . . . . . . . . . . . . 41
Economywide  perspective  of the  Australian  Industries
Assistance Commission ........  ...  . ....  42
Paper  resented  at the  Conference  on "Analytical  And  Negotiating  Issues
in the  Global  Trading  System,"  October  31-November  1, 1991,  University  of
Michigan,  Ann  Arbor,  Michigan.DO RULES CONTROL  POWER?
GATT ARTICLES AND  ARRANGEMENTS  IN  THE URUGUAY  ROUND
by
J.  Michael  Finger
and
Sumana  Dhar
In complicated  situations  efforts  to  Improve  things  often  tend  to  make them
worse,  sometimes  much worse,  on occasion  calamitous.
- Jay W. Forrester
Do rules  control  power.-  One  of the implicit  public  choice  precepts  of
the  GATT  is that  they do.  In theory,  the  GATT  strives  to  maintain  an (rderly
and  equitable  international  trading  system  by bringing  previously  agreed  rules
to  bear on differences  between  countries  as to  whether  or not  a particular
trade-restricting  action  may be taken. Without  rules,  the  GATT could  do no
more than  provide  a forum  for  open  negotiations  to reach  a situation-specific
outcome. Such  negotiations  would  end  up accommodating  ad-hoc  solutions:
temporary  palliatives;  or  worse,  venal  applications  of economic  or other
power.  Powerful  countries  would grab  the  "gains  from  trade"  away from  the
less  powerful,  the  trading  environment  :!ould  be unstable  and  unpredictable  -
from  the  perspective  of trading  enterpri  -. , a bad  business  climate.
Many  complain --  and give evidence --  that in recent years the GATT
system  has  become  more  power-oriented,  less  stable  and  less  equitable. A
concern  to reverse  this  drift  was one  of the  motives  that  brought  the
international  community  to agree  to  undertake  the  Uruguay  Round.  Thus  one of
the  Uruguay  Round  objectives,  stated  in  the  Punta  del  Este  declaration,  is to:
strengthen  the  role  of GATT,  improve  the  multilateral  trading
system  based  on the  principles  and  rules  of the  GATT  and  bring
about  a  wider  coverage  of world  trade  under  agreed,  effective  and
enforceable  multilateral  disciplines  [paragraph  I.A.(ii)].Rules  control  power,  the  signers  of the  Punte  del  Este declaration
presume,  therefore  elaboration  and  extension  of GATT  rules  would  move the
international  community  toward  a fairer,  more stable  international  trading
system.
Our  contention  is that  the  opposite  is true.  Particularly  in the
1980's,  the  elaboration  and application  of  GATT rules  has  been an exercise  in
the  application  of economic  and  2olitical  power,  not in its  control. While
GATT rules,  in theory,  are  there  to limit  national  use of trade  restrictions,
our  contention  is that,  in fact,  thinge  work the  other  way around:  national
practice  determines  what the  GATT  rules  mean.  GATT's  rules  do not  provide
limits  to national  practice,  they  provide  international  sanction  for it.  Such
rules  are  not  part  of the  solution,  they  are  part  of the  problem.
Our  presentation  contains  three  parts. In the  first  we examine  the
argument  for  GATT  rules  that  is summarized  above. In the  second  we provide  an
alternative  "model"  of the  relationship  between  GATT rules  and  national  trade
remedies,  one  that  is  more consistent  with the  facts  of tha  matter  than  is the
conventional  public  choice  model  of GATT  rules.  In  part III  we review
proposals  that  have been  tabled  at the  Uruguay  Round,  and  argue  that these
proposals  are  much  more consistent  with our "the  rules  apply  power"  thesis
than  with the "rules  control  power"  thesis. In the  final  section  we examine
the  policy  changes  that our  model  suggests  would  make things  better.
The reader should note and keep in mind that ours is a situation-
specific  argument,  not  a generic  one. 11 Our  target  is not "rules"  nor is it
"GATT." Our target  is the  GATT rules.
1/  This seems  a hard  point  to absorb. See,  for  example,  the second  paragraph
of David  Richardson's  discussion.
-2-I: THE  LOGIC  OF THE  IDEALIZED  GATT
(theory,  with rules  exogenous)
The  world trading  system  the  GATT envisages  would  have two  principal
characteristics.  (1)  It would  be a liberal,  or  open system;  though  not a
laissez  faire  system.  (2)  Government  intervention  in international  trade
would  be predictable,  i.e.,  only in  previously  stated  circumstances;  and  non-
discriminatory.
The openness  of the system  would  be achieved  through  successive  rounds
of  multilateral  -- sgotiations:  bargaining  to reduce  each  member  country's
import  restrictions  to minimal  levels  and  to bind  them against  unilateral
revision.
Minimizing  government  interventions
Minimizing  new government  interventions  in international  trade;  and
particularly,  limiting  these  interventions  to  previously  stated  circumstances,
are  what GATT's  rules  are about. Some  of the  rules  specify  actions  that
national  governments  must not take. The tariff  concessions  that  have  opened
the international  trading  system  would  be of little  import  if a government
were free  to take  offsetting  action  such  as imposing  excise  duties  that  fell
only  on imported  goods,  or assigning  artificial  customs  values  so as to
inflate  tariff  charges. Thus  the  GATT  bans  such  actions. Other  GATT ruies
specify  circumstances  in  which a  national  government  may restrict
international  trade. Article  XII, for  example,  states  that
any  contracting  party,  in order  to saieguard  its  external
financial  position  and its  balance  of payments,  may restrict  the
quantity  or  value  of  merchandise  permitted  to be imported,  subject
to the  provisions  of the  following  paragraphs  of this  Article.
(emphasis  added)
-3-Antidumping,  antisubsidy  and several  other  sort&  of import  restrictions
are similarly  provided  for.  (The  specifics,  i.,e.,  the  rules,  will be taken
u' in  more detail  in  the  next section.)
Give-and-take,  or teciprocity,  was to  be an important  element  in
building  a liberal  trading  -ystem. In the  trade  negotiations,  reductions  of
tariffs  were to be exchanged:  membership  in the  GATT committed  a country  to
participate  in the  tariff  negotiations,  but the  reductions  a country  made
would  be those  the  country  then  explicitly  bargained  away.  In the  rules  part
of the  GATT,  the  idea  of give-and-take,  or reciprocity,  is broader. The
GATT's  bans and  limits  on use  of non-tariff  restrictions  cover  all  products,
not  just those  on  which  a country  has  made particular  concessions. The  scope
of this  ban is implicit  in article  XXIII,  under  which  a country  is entitled  to
redress  wher.  any  benefit  accruing  to it  under  the  agreement  is "nullified  or
impaired,"  even if  that  nullification  or impairment  is  not the  result  of
another  country  having  failed  to  meet its  explicit  obligations. Thus  GATT's
sense  of reciprocity  or balance  extends  across  the  effects  of conditions  and
government  actions  not even  mentioned  in the  agreement.
But  judging  governmental  actions  against  the  broad  standard  of
"maintaining  across  countries  a balance  of  concessions  and  obligations"z'
invites  all of the  many dimensions  of international  relations  to come  to
bear --  and this  was something  GATT's  founders  wanted  to avoid. They  wanted
international  trade  to be the  business  of businessmen,  not of diplomats,  hence
they  wanted  governmental  intervention  in trade  to be limited  to the  few
circumstances  enumerated  in the  agreement. Their  intent  then  was that  trade
disputes  between  countries  be a  matter  of constrained  diplomacy  --  diplomacy
conditioned  by the  rules  and  procedures  stated  in  the  agreement.
2/  Because  of the  "mutuality"  of  GATT's  benefits  and  obligations --  crudely,
one  country's  obligation  not to impose  trade  restrictions  is another  country's
benefit  --  maintaining  a  balance  of concessions  and  obligations  is the  same  as
maintaining  a balance  of  benefits.
-4-Power  diplomacy  versus  rules  diplomacy
Table 1  compares  in schematic  fashion  the  characteristics  of open
diplomacy  and  rules-constrained  diplomacy. These  "types"  have  been qnalyzed
in several  studies  by Professor  John  H. Jackson,  and  we have tabulated  their
characteristics  from  his  work.3/  Open  diplomacy  is the  mode that  would
evolve  if diplomats  were guided  toward  no atandard  more  precise  than
"reciprocity,"  i.e.,  if they  were  not constrained  by specified  criteria  or
regularized  procedures. Such  a situation  allows  the  overall  status  or  power
of nations  to shape  outcomes. Following  Professor  Jackson,  we have labeled  it
"Power-oriented  diplomacy." Professor  Jackson's  other  polar  type is labeled
"Rules-oriented  diplomacy." Rules-oriented  diplomacy  might  be thought  of as
two-level  diplomacy:  at one  level  rules  or norms  are  agreed,  at the  other  they
are  applied. Application  then  includes  two  elements,  a set  of agreed  rules
and  an institution  authorized  to determine  if - rule  has  been  violated,  by
whom, and  to specify  what might  be done to fix  things. But  the institution
authorized  to evaluate  behavior  and  recommend  remedies  has  no sovereignty  over
the  disputant  powers. Its  power  is the  power  of persuasion,  armed  by appeal
to an internationally  agreed  standard.
IT both  modes,  negotiation  and  private  agreement  will be the  way in
which  differences  are  normally  settled. Each  party  knows  that impasse  will be
followed  by "institutional"  dispute  settlement  --  fact-finding,  evaluation,
interpretation  and  recommendation.  Hence  the  issue  will go to institutional
dispute  settlement  only  if one  disputant's  anticipation  of the  institution's
decision  is  considerably  different  from  the  other's  --  i.e.,  only  if the
parties  "read"  the  rules  quite  differently.
As explained  by Richard  N. Cooper  (1972),  "the  establishment  of rules
governing  international  trade  permitted  trade  issuas  to  be discussed  and
3/  Jagdish  Bhagwati's  (1991)  schema  of "Fix-rule"  ve:sus  "Fix-quantity,
results-oriented"  systems  is similar. We have followed  Professor  Jackson's
schema  because  it  has  been  more  elaborately  developed.
- 5 -Table  1
ELEMENTS  IN
PROFESSOR  JOHN  H. JACKSON'S  ANALYSIS  OF RULES  v. NEGOTIATION
-------------------  ----------------------------------------
Power-oriented  diplomacy  Rules-oriented  diplomacy
Negotiation  Rule  application
(1990,  p.  59)  I
Negotiating  forum  designed  to  Deal  with subjects  in  precise  detail
preserve  a balance  of concessions  so that  obligations  are  clear  and
and  obligations  unambiguous
(1990, p. 60)
Settlement  by r.egotiation  and  Settlement  by negotiation  or
agreement  with reference  (explicitly decision  with reference  to norms  or
or implicitly)  to relative  power  rules  to  which  both  parties  have
status  of the  parties  (1989,  p. 85)  previously  agreed
A forum  for  discussion  and  An international  institution  that
negotiation  --  the  OECD  is an  provides  concrete  and  reasonably
example  (1990,  p. 48)  precise  rules  that  governments  feel
are necessary --  the IMF is an
example
Every  issue  analyzed  through  the  Deal  with subjects  in  precise
international  institution,  with  detail;  obligations  of member
reference  to the  general  principle  governments  become  clear  and
of balance  unambiguous --  provisions applied
1990,  pp.  60-61)  by governments  without  formal
recourse  to the international
institution
Representatives  of disputant  nations  Institution  (third  party)  ensures
assert  the  status  or power  of each  highest  possible  adherence  to legal
(1978,  p. 98)  obligations
Intermediaries  encourage  and  assist  Intermediaries  encourage  and  assist
settlement  by reference  to the  settlement  primarily  by reference  to
economic  or other  power  of  the  existing  rules
disputants  (1990,  p. 75)
Advantage  to larger  countries  (1978,  Smaller  countries  less  vulnerable
p. 98)  _
-6-Power-oriented  diplomacy  Rules-oriented  diplomacy
Alternative  weapons  include  aid,  Outcome  limited  to the  criteria
trade  concessions,  exchange  rate  e  ecified  in the  rules.  hence  few
changes,  militarv  maneuvers  alternative  weapons  may be brought
(1978,  p. 98)  to  bear
Open  bargaining,  unconstrained  as to  Rules  and  guiding  institutions
procedure  or criteria  (1979,  p. 3)  -rovide  regularized  procedures,
limit  consideration  to specific
criteria
Settlement  reflects  the  effective  Settlement  reflects  international
power  or status  of the  disputants  determination  of  which  party
(1978,  p. 99)  breached  its  international
obligations  as codified  in the  rules
To solve  the instant  dispute  (by  To  promote  certain  longer-term  goals
conciliation,  obfuscation,  power-
threats  or otherwise)
(1990,  p. 59)
GATT's  -informal  role  as catalyst  for  The formal  role  of GATT  as third-
the resolution  of dicputes  (1990,  party  arbiter
pp.  59-60)  j
-7-resolved  iii  their  own  realm,  without  intruding  into  other  areas  of policy."
(p.  19)  Thus trade  policy  was in the  realm  of "'wv  foreign  policy."  Matters
of low  foreign  policy  take  up  many person-hours  in governments,  but relatively
little  of the  time  of higher-level  officials  whose  authoxity  spans  many
subject  areas  --  the "high  foreign  policy"  of  national  security  and sur-ival.
The  trade  policy  rules  would shape  not only  the  international  politics
of trade,  but the  domestic  politics  as  well.  National  commitments  to the
international  rules  form  the  basis  from  which  a national  government  can
equilibrate  between  diverse  domestic  interests:  produce-s  versus  consumers,
export  industries  versus  import  competing  industries.
How  close  does this  model  come  to the  real  world?  Robert  Hudec's  (1975)
reading  of GATT  history  --  a reading  we find  convincing  --  suggests  that  for
ten  years  or so it  came  close.  .h weakness  of the  model  however  is that it
does  not take  into  account  how  the  rules  are  made - it assumes  that  there
exist  a set  of rules  that  are  both  good  and  agreed,  then  focuses  on
application.4V  The  first  ten  years  of the  GATT  do not reveal  this  flaw
because,  we speculate,  the  rules  as interpreted  then  were both  agreed  and
good. We will argue  below  that  as the  rules  became  endogenous  they  became
both  more di3putatious  and less  good.
II.  THE  EVOLUTION  AND SIGNIFICANCE  OF THE  GATT  RULES
(theory,  with endogenous  rule3)
As World  War II ended,  maintaining  peace  and  stability  was the  major
objective  of  western  leadership.  An important  part  of the  liberal  design  for
world  peace  and  stability  was to increase  the  number  of nongovernmental
4/ Some  analysts  would  argue  that  GATT  is not  about  good  rules,  only  about
agreed  rules. Agreed  rules  will provide  stability  of trading  conditions  and
stability,  this  view claims,  is the  essence  of a liberal  system. We are  not
convinced  that  any set  of rules  (whatever  their  substantive  content)  that  are
agreed  will provide stability  of  business  conditions,  nor  that  those  will be
favorable  business  conditions. The  matter,  however,  is  not taken  up in  this
paper.
-8-contacts  between  nations  --  cultural  and  particularly  commercial  contacts.
Thus  western  leadership  insisted  that  world  trade  be open and  unregulated,  the
business  of businessmen,  not  of diplomats  or other  public  officials. The  GATT
evidenceo  the  success  of this leadership  in  moving  the  world toward
unrestricted  international  trade,  but it  also  reveals  some  of the  compromises
that  had to  be made along  the  way.
GATT  provisions  that  allow  trade  remedies  are  more correctly  plac-'
among  the  compromises  than  among  the  achievements.  They  say, for  example,
that
to safeguard  its  external  financial  position  ...  a [developing]
contracting  party  may ...  control  the  level  of its  imports  by
restricting  the  quantity  or  value  of  merchandise  permitted  to  be
imported  (article  XVIII.B,  paragraph  9);
or,
to offset  or prevent  dumping  a contracting  party  may levy  on any
dumped  product  an antidumping  duty (article  VI,  paragraph  2).
In short,  they  give  countries  permission  to impose  import  restrictions.
In  GATT's  early  years  (just  after  WWII)  the  most frequently  used
permission  to restrict  imports  was Article  XII,  under  which the  industrial
countries  imposed  trade  restrictions  to protect  their  balances  of payments.
By the  mid-1960's,  almost  all  of these  restrictions  had  been eliminated  --
Anjaria (1987)  points  out  that  between  1958  and 1964  the  number  of industrial
countries  invoking  Article  XII  fell  from 14  to 3 (p.  672).  Since  then,  nearly
all  GATT-legal  trade  restrictions  have  been  imposed  under  article  VI, that
allows  antidumping  and  countervailing  duties;  and  article  XVIII:B,  allowing
developing  countries  to restrict  imports  to  protect  the  balance  of payments.
Article  XVIII:C  allows  developing  countries  to impose  infant  industry
protection  but  few  countries  have  notified  restrictions  under  this  article.
Article  XVIII:C  carries  tougher  notification  and  compensation  requirements
than  the  balance  cf payments  article;  and  though  the  economic  logic  of balance
- 9  -of payments  measures  suggests  that they  be applied  across-the-board,  article
XVIII:B  allows  such  measures  to  vary  according  to  how "essential"  different
products  are.  Hence  restrictions  imposed  for  "infant  industry"  purposes  can
readily  be "notified"  as balance  of payments  measures,  and  they  usually ,re.
Anjaria's  tabulation  found  that in  the  mid-1980's  eighteen  developing
countries  had  notified  import  restrictions  under  the  balance  of payments
criterion. In eight  of the  eighteen  countries  the restrictions  covered  20
percent  or less  of import  categories,  in only  one  did  the  notified
restrictions  cover  as  much as 75 percent  of import  categories.
Over  the  past two  decades,  GATT  article  VI,  that  allows  antidumping  and
countervailing  duties,  has been  the  r  st frequently  used  GATT cover  for  trade
restrictions.  Patrick  Messer'lin's  (1990)  tabulation  of 1979-1988
notifications  to the  GATT reports  a total  of 2384  restrictions,  more than
three-fourths  were antidumping  actions,  and  another  18 percent  were
countervailing  duty  actions. Only sixty-eight  s feguards  actions  were
notified,  less  then 3  percent  of the  total.
Even developing  countries  are  switching  to article  VI for  GATT  cover  for
their  import  restrictions.  By the  end  of the  1980s,  the  pace of GATT
consultations  under  article  XVIII:B  was down  to one  country  per  year.  (U.S.
International  Trade  Commission,  1991,  p. 44)  In 1989,  several  developing
countries,  including  Korea,  Mexico  and  Brazil,  notified  the  GATT of
antidumping  cases  they  had  undertaken.
The  antidumping  rules  are  now the  popular  form  of GATT  cover  for  import
restrictions.  The  evolution  of these  rules  illustrates  well the  public  choice
dimensions  of the  rules  part of the  GATT.  This evolution  is explained  at
greater  length  and is  more extensively  documented  in a forthcoming  book,
Finger  and  Associates  (1992):  here  we will touch  only two  incidents  in  that
evolution.
- 10  -An example:  the  evolution  of the  antidumping  rules
The accepted  reading  of  the  GATT's  negotiating  history  is that  no
country  delegation  to the  international  trade  organization  or the  GATT
negotiations  strongly  insisted  on including  a provision  for  antidumping  (see,
for  example,  Barcelo  1991  and  Jackson  1969). And though  there  was concern
that antidumping  laws  might  compromise  the  objectives  of the  agreement  if
overused,  the  drafting  committees  concluded  without  controversy  that
antidumping  and  countervailing  duty  provisions  were  needed.
Through  GATT's  first  two  decades,  antidumping  was a  major instrument  of
policy  only in  Australia,  Canada,  and  South  Africa. On the international
scene,  it  was a minor  issue. Though  the  GATT came  into  force  in 1948,  the
contracting  parties  (as  GATT  member  countries  are  called)  did  not  canvass
themselves  about  the  use of antidumping  until 1958. The  resulting  tally
showed  a total  of thirty-seven  antidumping  decrees  in force  as of May 1958,
twenty-two  of them  in South  Africa. A similar  tally  in 1989  found  530.
(Because  Canadian  and  Australian  antidumping  actions  could  not  be
distinguished  from  every-day  customs  valuation  determinations,  the 1958  tally
did  not cover  those  two  countries.)
The  Kennedy  Round  antidumping  code.  Antidumping  first  became  a
significant  GATT issue  at the  Kennedy  Round  of 1964-67,  perhaps  more  by dint
of diplomatic  manipulation  than  by clear  intent. As Kenneth  Dam (1970)
explains,  "The  United  States,  having  introduced  the  subject  of nontariff
barriers  into  the  negotiations,  was chagrined  to find  that  the  nontariff
barriers  most often  singled  out  by other  countries  for  priority  of action  were
those  maintained  by the  United  States,  of  which one  of the  most often
mentioned  was the  U.S.  antidumping  statute"  (174). The attack  on  U.S.
antidumping  was clearly  a strategy  of offense  being  the  best defense  of the
European  nontariff  barriers  that  the  United  States  had  wanted  brought  to the
negotiating  table. From  passage  of the  U.S.  antidumping  law  in 1921  through
December  31,  1967,  the  U.S.  government  had  conducted  a total  of 706
- 11  -antidumping  investigations  --  all  but 75 of them  had  ended  with a  negative
determination  (Seavey  1970,  65).
In those  years,  the function  of  UA.. antidumping  and "escape  clause"
procedures  was  much  more to preserve  the  openness  of the  U.S.  market  than to
restrict  foreign  access. Particular  pressures  for  protection  that in  Smoot-
Hawley  days  would  have brought  the  congress  to enact  higher  tariff  rates  could
be diverted  into  antidumping  or escape-clause  investigations.  As long  as the
U.S. government  could  dismiss  nine  out  of ten  petitions  as unworthy,  the  few
restrictions  added  by these  "trade  remedies"  were  more than  offset  by
reductions  agreed  at the  almost  continuous  rounds  of GATT  tariff  negotiations.
Nevertheless,  the  U.S.  delegation  to the  Kennedy  Round  adopted  a
strategy  of accommodation  rather  than  of explanation  or defense. The  U.S.
administration  defended  the  resulting  antidumping  code  against  criticism  from
congress  on grounds  that  it  would  discipline  Canada  and  the  United  Kingdom  and
insure  against  European  Community  (EC)  restrictions  on U.S.  exports.  (The  EC
was developing  its  own  antidumping  regulations  at the  time.)  When the
administration  realized  that  congress  would  not legislate  the  changes  required
by the  code,  it insisted  that  the  executive  branch  had the  power  to implement
these  changes  by modifying  investigation  and  enforcement  procedures. The
congress  disagreed.
The resulting  scrimmage  between  the  administration  and  the congress  was
one  of  many through  which the  congress  reasserted  its  control  over  U.S. trade
policy. Antidumping,  countervailing  duties,  and safeguards  --  the  major  trade
retiedies  --  were often  the focus  of these  scrimmages. Broadening  and
strengthening  these  trade  remedies  was, to the congress,  much  more than  a
means  to retake  control  of trade  policy  from  the  president. It  was  also an
important  congressional  objective  on its  own.  Adding  this  or that  technical
amendment  --  tailor-made  to fit  the  situation  of a particular  and  powerful
constituent  --  soon  became  another  vehicle  for  constituent  service,  the
lifeblood  of congressional  politics.
- 12 -The reasons  antidumping  emerged  as a major  policy  instrument  in the  EC
were not  all that  different  from  those  in  the  United  States. Slower  growth
made European  governments  sensitive  to displacement  of domestic  production  by
emerging  Asian  exporters. The  EC antidumping  mechanism  --  essentially  the
GATT  Tokyo  Round  antidumping  code  translated  into  operational  language  (see
Eymann-Schuknecht,  1991)  --  proved  a doubly  convenient  means  for  responding.
As economics,  it  was flexible  enough  to cover  all  problems. As politics,  it
was a community  instrument. The  EC Commission,  with the  instinct  of any
organization  for  demonstrating  its  usefulness  and  thereby  expanding  its  turf,
pressed  forward  with antidumping  action  to preempt  member  state  governments
from  serving  industries'  increased  demand  for  protection. And those  who  might
have  opposed  either  the  illiberality  of such  actions  or the shift  of
regulatory  practice  to  Brussels  were slow  to see  through  the  camouflage  of
propriety  that  cloaks  antidumping  actions.
The  growth  of unfair  trade  regulation  in  national  trade  policies  is the
cumulation  of  many changes,  some  small,  some  not so small. Each of the
changes  was made  because  antidumping,  if  expanded  in  a particular  way, could
fix  a pressing  political  problem. The  dominant  question  was always  "How  can
antidumping  be applied  to this  problem?"  The  question  was never  "Is  this
really  a problem  caused  by dumping?"
Perhaps  the  most significant  step  in the  expansion  of antidumping  into  a
weapon  against  all imports  was its  extension  to imports  not  priced  at full
cost.  This extension  expanded  the  substantive  scope  of the  instrument  and it
brought  antidumping's  administrative  focus  in line  with its  political  focus:
keeping  import  prices  high  enough  to prevent  injury  to domestic  companies.
The  extension  also  necessitated  a significant  increase  in administrative
discretion, allowing administrators --  pushed by ever more powerful
protectionist  pressures  --  to  probe  for  new  ways to expand  the  scope  and  power
of the instrument.
- 13 -We want to highlight  here one  facet  of the  extension  to  below-cost
pricing. This  extension  illustrates  the  role  power  politics  has  played,  at
both  the  national  and  the international  level,  in the  emergence  of antidumping
as an all-purpose  weapon  against  imports.
Power  Rolitics:  national. In the  1930's,  when the  U.S. and  many other
countries  raised  their  tariffs,  the  increase  of  Canadian  protection  was
achieved  by adjustments  to customs  valuation  practices  and  expansion  of the
scope  of Canadian  antidumping  law.V'  In amendments  passed  in 1921  and 1930,
Canada  extended  its  antidumping  regulations  to  cover  sales  below  fully
allocated  costs  plus  a reasonable  allowance  for  overhead  and  profit. Given
the  depressed  markets  of the 1930s,  that  meant  that  antidumping  action  could
be taken  against  almost  any  import  shipment. Antidumping  could  be used
against  what the  Canadian  government  perceived  to be a major  economic
problem  --  generally  low  prices.
Action  against  below-cost  imports  came  into  U.S.  antidumping  practice
through  the  back  door.  The 1921  U.S.  law  provided  that  if the  administrator
was unable  to determine  the  exporter's  home-market  price  (because  there  were
no home-market  sales,  or for  other  reasons)  and  if he could  not  determine  the
exporter's  price  in  a third  market,  then  he could  base  an antidumping  case on
an estimate  of the  exporter's  cost. U.S.  business  was as anxious  as Canadian
to have  protection  against  below-cost  sales,  but  because  the  U.S.  congress  in
the 1920s  and 1930s  was generous  with tariff  protection,  U.S.  business  did  not
press  for  extension  of the  scope  of antidumping.
However,  as the  export  capacity  of other  countries  increased  and  the
U.S. tariff  was negotiated  downward,  pressure  increased  for  trade  remedy
5/  In the 1930's  Canada's  antidumping  procedure  was, legally  and
administratively,  a part  of customs  valuation.  Orville  J.  McDiarmid  (1946),
a Canadian  economic  historian, has documented  the  Canadian  government's
frequent  use  of antidumping  and  other  customs  valuation  procedures  to respond
to domestic  pressures  for  protection. McDiarmid  concluded  "The  power  of the
executive  to fix  prices  at  which imports  could  be sold  in Canada  was
practically  unlimited.  ...  The  decision  of the  minister  of customs  and  his
civil  service  advisers  became  the final  arbiter  (pp.  310-311)."
- 14 -action. This  pressure  eventually  brought  the  administering  agency  to add
below-cost  imports  to the  circumstances  under  which  antidumping  action  would
be taken.
The antidumping  administrators  found  the  necessary  legal  cover  in the
following  sentence  in the  U.S.  antidumping  law:  "The  foreign  market  value  of
imported  merchandise  ...  shall  be the  price ...  at  which such  or similar
merchandise  is sold ...  in ...  the  home  country  ...  in  the  ordinary  coursa  of
trade"  (U.S.  Code 1677b,  emphasis  added).  (The  highlighted  phrase  is also in
GATT  article  VI.)  Sales  below full  cost,  the  U.S.  administrator  interpreted,
were not  made in the  ordinary  course  of trade. Before  data  on foreign  price
could  be used,  the  prices  had to be compared  with the  exporter's  cost,  and
prices  below  cost  would  be thrown  out.
Action  against  import  sales  below  full  cost  thus  came  into  U.S.
antidumping  policy  as a revision  of administrative  interpretation,  not  as a
legislated  change. When the  administering  agency  (then  the  U.S. Treasury
Department)  first  adopted  this interpretation,  it  tried  to limit  application
to instances  that  could  not be explained  as reductions  of  price  to  meet
competition  in  a temporarily  depressed  market. But  the  agency  had the  bad
judgment  not  to apply  the  below-cost  standard  when it  was critical  to an
antidumping  request  from  a company  with a  politically  powerful  friend. The
friend  was Senator  Russell  Long of  Louisiana  who, as chairman  of the  Senate
Finance  Committee,  probably  had  more  power  over  trade  legislation  than  any
other  person  in congress. Pending  at the  time  was the  1974  trade  bill,  whose
main purpose  was to authorize  U.S.  participation  in  the  Tokyo  Round  of GATT
negotiations.  Senator  Long included  in the  bill an amendment  to the
antidumping  law to require  that  sales  below  cost  be considered  dumping.
Power  politics:  international.  International  sanction  for  antidumping
action  against  imports  priced  below  fully  allocated  costs  came  about  in  a
similarly  arbitrary  way.  The  Tokyo  Round  antidumping  code  allows  for "normal
value"  (the  generic  term  in the  GATT for  home-market  price)  to  be determined
- 15  -on some  basis  other  than  market  price  in the  exporting  country  "when  there  are
no sales  of the  like  products  in the  ordinary  course  of trade  ...  or  when ...
such sales  do not pe-mit  a proper  comparison"  (article  II:4).
The code  itself  does  not  clarify  whether  sales  below  cost  are  covered  by
this  expression.  But in November  1978,  when some  parts  of the  code  were
still  being  negotiated,  Australia,  Canada,  the  European  Community,  and  the
United  States  reached  an understanding  that  it is appropriate  to regard  sales
below  costs  as "not  in the  ordinary  course  of trade"  and  to exclude  them  from
the  determination  of foreign  market  value. A document  announcing  this
understanding  was circulated  in  the  manner  in  which  negotiating  proposals  or
comments  on  proposals  were normally  distributed  (Koulen  1989,  366).
Action  against  below-cost  imports  continues  to be an  major  part  of
antidumping  policy  everywhere. Current  U.S.  administrative  practice  is that
if 10  percent  or more of observed  foreign  sales  are  below  estimated  cost,  such
sales  are  not included  in the  calculation  of foreign  market  value.  This  means
that  in any  investigation,  up to 90  percent  of the  U.S. government's
information  on foreign  price  --  the  90 percent  most favorable  to the
exporter's  case  --  may be thrown  oat.  There  has  been  no GATT challenge  to
practice  in the  United  States  or in  any  other  country.
After  many changes  such  as this  one  --  generic  words to extend
antidumping  protection  to a  pressing  interest  --  "dumping"  has  no meaning
other  than  the  cumulation  of circumatances  in  which  the  politics  of the
immediate  problem  have  exploited  the  flexibility  of the  underlying
admiinistrative  structure  to rationalize  action  against  imports. The
corruption  of the "rule-making"  process  fed  on itself. As antidumping  became
more and  more detailed,  the  motive  behind  subsequent  changes  became  mote and
more to find  a  way to fit  antidumping  to each  immediate  problem.  (If  your
favorite  tool is a  hammer,  your  problems  will all  look like  nails.) "Dumping"
has come  to  mean, in  GATT law  as  well as in  national  practice,  anything  you
can  get the  government  to  act  against  under  the  antidumping  law.
- 16  -The ascendance  of trade  remedies
Speaking  figuratively,  when the  GATT  began  the  trade  remedies  iragon  was
a small  one,  chained  to the  service  of an internationalist  master. Amenda.nt
by amendment,  antidumping  aad  the  other  trade  remedies  grew larger  and
stronger,  becoming  the  dragon  that  the  early  negotiators  feared  they  might
become. One day,  the  positions  in  national  trade  policiez'  of the  trade
remedies  and the  trade  negotiations  were reversed. 11 Now the
internationalists  are  chained  to the  service  of the trade  remedies  dragon  --
as  mindless  of the  function  they  serve  as  was the  dragon  when it  was small.'/
III.  WHERE  THE  GATT  RULES  GO  WRONG
We stated  above  that  our  quarrel  was  with the  rules,  it is  now time  to
state  the  specifics  of our  quarrel:
- The devil,  not  virtue,  is in the  details.
*  Their  basic  economics  leads  to  autarchy.
- Their  legal  principles  are shameful.
In turn,  each  of these  will be explained.
The  devil  is in the  details
Putting  a good  face  on a necessary  bargain,  some  contemporary
interpreters  have argued  that  the  underlying  logic  of the  GATT rules  is that
if the  circumstances  under  whtch  a country  may impede  trade  are specified,  it
will do so less  often. The Tokyo  Round  codes  advanced  this  view even further
--  that  the  GATT limits  on trade  remedies  were in the  GATT  details. An
6/ The  several  elements  that  contributed  to  this reversal  are  discussed  in
Finger  (1986).
7/ Robert  E. Baldwin  (1985)  traces  how  amendments  to the  US escape  clause  have
made it  more protectionist. There  has  been  no parallel  evolution  of GATT's
treatment  of safeguards.  With antidumping  expanded  to  provide  GATT legality
for  the  industrial  countries'  import  restrictions  there  has  been  no need to
probe  the  limits  of safeguards.
- 17  -eighteen-page  antidumping  code  was negotiated  to elaborate  and  apply  the  two
pages  in the  GATT.
It does  not seem,  however,  that  GATT's  original  sponsors  believed  that
the  agreement's  ability  to limit  new  trade  restrictions  lay  in the  trade
remedies  details. Neither  the  international  trade  organization  negotiations
nor the  GATT  negotiations  probed  for  detail,  and the  agreement  that  was
finally  made (the  GATT)  avoided  detailed  specifications.  Detail  came  much
later,  in the 1979  Tokyo  Round  codes. The  founders'  brevity  suggests  that
they  recognized  the inherent  flexibility  of the  concepts  on  which they  were
building.  8/
The logic  of these  provisions  as controls  over  the  very actions  chey
permitted  seems  then  to depend  on two  elements:  (1)  that  the  specifications  of
circumstances  provided  some  basis  for  limiting  action,  and (2)  that the
administrators  of the  antidumping  system  would  be sympathetic  to preserving
the  openness  of the  international  system  and  therefore  hesitant  to impose
trade  restrictions. So disposed,  administrators  would  use the  flexibility  of
the  concepts  to conclude  that  the  circumstances  of each  case  were not those  in
which  action  was allowed.
The facts  bear out  this  interpretation.  Nine  of ten  U.S. investigations
before  1967  led  to rejected  petitions. Today  we have  ten  times  more  GATT
rules,  ten  times  more  U.S. trade  law,  and  ten  times  more administrative
I/  The structure  of the  dispute  settlement  process  suggests  the same  thing.
GATT's  negotiators  recognized  that  however  "obligations"  were  worded,  a
contracting  party  could  always  find  a  way to restrict  imports  without
violating  these  obligations.  Thus the  drafters  provided  that  dispute
settlement  could  take  up any instance  in  which the  complaining  party  was being
denied  a benefit  to  which  the  agreement  entitled  him.  Explicitly,  no  violation
by another  party  was necessary  for  the  complaining  party  to  have a case.
- 18 -regulations  --  and,  nine  of ten  U.S.  dumping  investigations  reach  affirmative
findings.1'
The  underlying  economics  encourages  autarchy
lWe  concluded  above  that  the  functional  definition  of "dumping"  is
"anything  you  can get  the  government  to act  against  under  the  antidumping
laws." The  next question  is:  What can  you get  the  government  to act  against
under  the  antidumping  laws?  The  answer:  injury  to domestic  preducers. The
"dumping"  test is strictly  ceremonial,  an elaborate  ritual  to recite  the
litany  of evils  and  unfairnesses  of exporters,  thereby  working  the  country
into  the  emotional  mood to restrict  imports  (an  act  to  which the  people  of the
country  are,  in principle,  opposed). The dumping  test  is always  affirmative  -
- it always  passes  the  buck  to the injury  test. The rules  thus  justify
restricting  any  import  that "causes  or threatens  material  injury  to an
established  industry  or materially  retards  the  establishment  of an industry."
(GATT  Article  VI.6)
What does  that  mean in practice? It means  something  severe  enough  that
the  European  Community,  defends  its  interpretation  of it  as liberal  because
In practice,  the  level  of the [antidumping]  duty is  mainly
determined  by the  level  of price  undercutting  ...  or by the level
9/  There  are  many instances  in  GATT's  early  history  to suggest  that  reduction
of trade  restrictions  was not  driven  by the cleverness  of GATT's  words  or
arrangements,  nor  by the  power  of an international  agreement  to overcome
protectionist  interests.  Progress  was driven  by the  determination  and  courage
of GATT's  founders  to advance  a set  of policies  they  passionately  felt  to be
right.  The  early  tariff  negotiators  were almost  always  beyond  the  limits  of
domestic  political  safety  and  sometimes  beyond  the limits  of their  legal
authority.  The  GATT  negotiations  provided  the  leaders  of the  international
community  an opportunity.  The  resulting  document  was not  a statement  of their
objectives  and it  was not a  laissez  passer  through  the  protectionist
opposition.  It is the  path brave  men and  women  have  hacked  through  the
protectionist  opposition,  and  some  of its  signposts  are  monuments  to their
losses. It took strong  leadership  to  build  and  defend  the  system. Today's
view is that  a strong  system  will defend  the  leadership. Curzon  (1965,
chapters  III,  IV and  V) is  a good reference.
- 19  -of resale  prices  that  would  be required  to cover  the  costs  of
Community  producers  and  provide  a reasonable  profit."
Compare  that  statement  above  with the  following  one:
In any  protective  legislation  the  true  principle  of protection  is
best  maintained  by the imposition  of such  duties  as  will equal  the
difference  between  the  cost  of production  at  home and  abroad,
together  with a realonable  profit  to  American  industries. (quoted
in  Taussig  1931,  p. 363)
Thn  second  of these  is the 1908  U.S.  Republican  party  platform  statement
of the  cost-equalization  formula:  the  formula  that  the  U.S.  congress  followed
in  writing  the  Smoot-Hawley  Tariff. Frank  Taussig  (1931)  points  out that
anything  can  be made  within  any  country  if the  producer  is assured  a price
high  enough  to cover  all  cost  of production  together  with a reasonable
allowance  for  profits. "Yet,"  he adds,  "little  acumen  is  needed  to see  that,
carried  out  ccnsistently,  it  means  simple  prohibition  and  complete  stoppage  of
foreign  trade"  (633).
Perhaps  it is  overkill  to recall  the  wisdom  of Frank  Taussig  to argue
that  contemporary  trade  remedies  are  out  of control. It should  be sufficient
to point  out  that  its  own  defenders  bring  forward  the  economic  philosophy  of
the  Smoot-Hawley  Tariff  as their  underlying  rationale.
Shameful legal principles
Antidumping  began  in 1904  as another  in a long  series  of customs
valuation  tricks  the  Canadian  government  came  up  with to  mollify  one  or
another  protection-seeking  group  in a period  in  which  raising  the  tariff  would
have  been  politically  difficult. Other  countries  soon followed  Canada's
example. Creating  "antidumping"  as a separate  category  of trade
administration  made it  possible  for  governments  to clean  up customs  valuation:
10/  Bellis,  pp. 84-84.
- 20 -what had  previously  been  the  dirty  tricks  of customs  administration  became  the
explicitly  sanctioned  practice  of anticumping.
One  of the  significant  legal  characteristics  of antidumping  is that  the
accused  is not  protected  against  multiple  jeopardy. If the  petitioner  for
antidumping  action  does  not succeed  with his first  petition,  he may try
again  --  and  again,  and  again. The  U.S  cut  flowers  industry  filed  more than
twenty  trade  remedies  complaints  against  imports  from  Columbia:  not just
antidumping  cases,  countervailing  duty  and  escape  clause  cases,  too. When the
U.S. International  Trade  Commission  found  that  there  had been  no injury  to the
U.S. cut  flowers  industry,  the  industry  filed  separate  petitions  for  ordinary
chrysanthemums,  pom-pom  chrysanthemums,  long-stem  roses,  sweetheart  roses,
etc.  Swedish  exports  of stainless  steel  were found  innocent  when attacked
with safeguards  cases,  "301"  cases  and  countervailing  duty  cases. The Swedish
industry  was continuously  pressured  by the  U.S. government  to accept  a
voluntary  export  restraint  agreement,  but  continuously  refused. In the  end,
the  U.S.  government  found  in the  affirmative  in  an antidumping  case,  the
resulting  antidumping  order  against  Sweden  completing  the  U.S.  go-ernment's
program  to control  steel  imports  from  all  sources.
The flaws  are  synergistic
The flaws  of antidumping  practice  are  worse  than  additive,  they  are
Gynergistic. As long  as the  trade  remedies  were generally  worded  (a
protectionist  would say  "vaguely"),  administrators  who  wanted  few  trade
restrictions  could  interpret  them in  a  way that  made economic  sense. But  as
interpretation  shifted  to the  specific,  the  implicit  economics  became  a
greater  and  greater  failing:  the  trade  remedies  came  to explicitly  empower  the
beneficiaries  of import  protection  and to  explicitly  disenfranchise  everyone
else.  The technicality  that  would trap  any  particular  exporter  is in the
rules  somewhere,  the  multiple  jeopardy  dimension  of antidumping  and other
- 21 -trade  remedies  give  the  petitioner  seeking  protection  as  many bites  at the
apple  as he needs  to find  the  restrictive  one.
Because  of the  one-sided  economics  of the  system,  repeated  attacks  on
the  exporter  have  no political  cost. Each iteration  of the  technical
specifications  allows  the  industry  to renew  and  refresh  the  political  rhetoric
of its  accusations  against  foreign  exporters. A sequence  of cases  thus  not
only  searches  for  the  winning  combination  of technicalities,  but  it also
builds  political  pressure  on the  government  to do something  for  the industry
--  to  accept  one  of the  technical  combinations  as satisfying  the  criteria  for
relief. The only  cost  the  system  puts  on the  petitioner  is  to pay the
lawyers'  fees..LI
IV.  GATT ARTICLES AND  AGREEMENTS  IN  THE URUGUAY  ROUND
The  Uruguay  Round,  as it  was structured  for  the first  four  years,
included  a  negotiating  group  on '.ATT Articles  and  another  on GATT Agreements
and  Arrangements.  There  are  thirty-eight  GATT articles  and 180  or so  GATT
agreements  or arrangements,  so the  potential  scope  for  these  negotiations  is
very broad. When negotiations  were resumed  in 1991,  these  groups  were
combined  with safeguards,  subsidy-countervail  and  dispute  settlement  into  a
larger  group  unofficially  labeled  "GATT  Rules." Functionally  speaking,  the
subjects  that  were grouped  together  were those  that  related  to the  task  of
protecting  market  acce-s,  including  the  value  of concessions  previously
agreed.
11/  The administrative  costs  the  system  imposes  do not  necessarily  embarass
the  congress  nor disadvantage  protection  seekers. Costs  to  petitioners  can  be
another  vehicle  for  constituent  service:  members  of congress  can  press
administrators  to  help small  petitioners. And, the  government  may  be the
first  one  to blink  over  administrative  costs. The  U.S.  steel  industry's
strategy  in the  mid-1980's  was to file  so  many trade  remedies  petitions  that
the  government  would  not  have the  capacity  to investigate  all  of them in
detail  and  within  the  time liumits  that  the  law  requires. Negotiating  VER's
was the  only  way out  for  the  government.
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negotiations  lists  thirteen  "articles  and  agreements"  subjects  that  have  been
taken  up.  By the  December  1, 1990,  deadline,  texts  had been  agreed  on several
of them,  each  country's  agreement  being  ad referendum,  i.e.,  subject  to
acceptance  of the  final,  across-the-entire-round,  package.
Some  of the  tentative  agreements  within  the  "articles  and agreements"
groups  are  aimed  at  making  administrative  procedures,  e.g.,  import  licensing
and  customs  valuation,  more transparent  and  neutral. Others,  such  as the
tentative  agreements  to expand  the government  procurement  code and  to
eliminate  GATT  waivers,  are  more directly  aimed  at eliminating  trade  barriers.
Final  acceptance  of some  of these  tentative  agreements  will require
substantial  progress  in other  negotiating  groups. For example,  United  States
agriculture  policy  has enjoyed  a GATT  waiver  since  1955,  and  the  United  States
is  not likely  to agree,  in  the  end, to  a provision  that  would terminate  the
U.S.  waiver  unless  other  countries  agree  to substantial  reductions  of their
agriculture  supports.
Controlling antidumping is the key issue
The charge  of the  Rules  Group  is  to preserve  market  access  --  the
openness  of the trading  system  --  against  further  erosion. Because
antidumping  is  where the  protectionist  action  is,  the  first  challenge  is  to
bring  antidumping  under  control. And,  antidumping  must be brought  under
control  in a  way that  prevents  protectionist  pressures  from  simply  shifting
horses. It  was easy  to  have honest  customs  valuation  once  antidumping  had
been  invented  to do the dirty  work:  and  even  if  customs  valuation  and
- 23 -antidumping  were both "clean,"  there  are  sixteen  other  areas  of  GATT rules
that  might  be bent to serve  protectionist  purposes..L1V
An academic  issue:  Safeguards
We should  distinguish  the  meaning  oi "Safeguards"  (with  a uppercase  "S")
--  article XIX stuff --  from "safeguards" (with a lowercase "s") --  how
governments  respond  when a domestic  interest  want protection. Functionally
speaking,  antidumping  is the  currently  popular  safeguards  mechanism;
nevertheless,  the  international  community  continues  with elaborate,  but only
symbolic,  negotiations  on Safeguards.
The reason  there  are  no Safeguards  actions  is similar  to  why there  are
no Article  XVIII:C  (infant  industry  protection)  notifications:  another  article
provides  more convenient  GA¶lr  cover. A developing  country  can  notify  any
import  restriction  under  XVIII:B,  and  XVIII:B  has less  stringent  notification
and  compensation  requirements.  Likewise,  the  industrial  countries  notify
under  Article  VI, antidumping,  rather  than  Article  XIX (Safeguards).  Article
VI has  no compensation  requirement,  and  because  it provides  the  protection-
seeking  industry  and  the  protection  granting  government  the  balm of labeling
the  exporter  "unfair,"  Article  VI carries  less  embarrassing  domestic  politics.
The illusion  that  keeps  the  Safeguards  nagotiations  going  is that
Safeguards  can discipline  the  use  of "grey  area  measures." The grey  area
measures  are "voluntary"  export  restraints  that  exporters  have implemented  to
escape  the  very legal  antidumping  orders  that  were just  around  the
administrative  corner:  very legal  re  national  law  and  re GATT.  It is  however
12/  Jackson  (1989,  pp. 40-43)  enumerates  eight  different  GATT "obligations"
and  ten  different  "exceptions"  to GATT  obligations.  Generally  speaking,
obligations  are statements  that  specify  trade-affecting  actions  national
governments  may  not take,  exceptions  are  statements  of trade-affecting  actions
national  governments  may take.  The  categories  overlap,  for  example,  Jackson
lists  antidumping  and  countervailing  duties  under  obligations,  balance  of
payments  and  development  exceptions  under  exceptions.  The overlap  reflects
the  basic  intent  of the  GATT  rules  to limit  government  intervention:  even the
GATT  provision  for  voting  explicit  waivers  to GATT obligations  has  the intent
of containing  to the  specifics  of the  waiver  a national  action  that  violates
the  spirit  of the  GATT.
- 24 -nonsense  to think  that  reform  of Safeguards  will discipline  grey area
measures. If each  day  you surrender  your lunch-money  to the  class  bully  at
knife-point,  a school  rule  prohibiting  firearms  --  even  if effectively  policed
--  will do you no good.
In the Safeguards  group,  the  United  States  has offered  administrative
menus  to determine  injury,  threat  of injury,  causal  link  to imports,  etc.
These  menus  would  provide  for  transparency,  notification,  opportunity  to
consult:  all the  administrative  virtues  the  world  bought  from  the  United
States  and  put into  the  Tokyo  kound  Antidumping  Code.  The  current  negotiating
text  includes  these  proposals,  along  with elimination  of the  victim's  right  to
retaliate  if  the Safeguards  action  is for  three  years  or less. The  European
Community  has  proposed  to allow  quantitative  restrictions  that  would  not
target  specific  exporters. The Safeguarder  could,  however,  "modulate"  the
global  quota  among  sources  of imports;  as  was necessary  to eliminate  injury  to
the  domestic  industry  Safeguarded.
Suppose  the  international  community  accepted  the  tentatively  agreed
proposals  for  bureaucratization  and  for  elimination  of the  right  to
retaliation,  and  added  to these  the  European  Community's  proposal  for  targeted
quantitative  restrictions. If so,  today's  questionable  antidumping  actions
and  gray  area  VER's  could  be notified  as honest  Safeguards. Just  as in 1904
Canada  made an honest  man of its  customs  administrator  by giving  him  a second
legal  title,  antidumping  enforcer;  the  new  article  XIX  would turn  today's
sleazy  export  restraint  negotiators  and  overzealous  antidumping  administrators
into  Honest  Safeguarders.
The  Uruguay  Round  antidumping  proposals
In July 1990,  the  GATT Secretariat  tabulated  the  proposals  for
antidumping  reform  that  had  been submitted  at the  Uruguay  Round  (GATT  1990d).
The tabulation  covered  172  pages. The  proposed  changes  were  what the  history
of antidumping  suggests  they  would  be:  generic  language  to add or repeal
- 25  -technicalities  associated  with particular  antidumping  cases. For example,  the
first  proposal  in the  Nordic  countries'  submission  (GATT  1990e)  is to change
the  GATT antidumping  code  preamble  as follows,  the  words  in italics  being  the
proposed  changet  "antidumping  duties  may  be applied  ...  only if  a causal
relationship  can  be  clearly  established  between  ... "  (1).1'
Compare  that  statement  with the  following  one,  made  by the  Swedish
government  when it took the  U.S.  antidumping  action  against  Sandvik  Steel,  AB,
to the  signatories  of the  GATT antidumping  code  for  conciliation:  "The  main
issue  is that  no causal  link  between  dumping  and  injury  has been
demonstrated..."  (GATT  1988,  2).
Thus Sweden's  proposed  change  of the  rules  (submitted  through  the  Nordic
group)  is the  same  thing  as Sweden's  plea to  have  a specific  antidumping
action  declared  illegal.
Not every  proposed  change  would take  away  a  past action:  some  would
justify  one.  The  United  States  has  proposed  changes  that  would  explicitly
validate  U.S. actions  against  "recurrent  dumping"  and  "repeat  corporate
dumping." The  European  Community  (EC)  has  proposed  changes  that  would
validate  already-in-place  actions  to prevent  circumvention.  And  many of the
proposals  are  opposed  "pairs"  in the  sense  that  one  would  discredit  what the
other  would  validate. One  such  pair  contains  the  EC's  proposals  to expand  the
meaning  of "like  product"  and  thereby  validate  certain  anticircumvention
measures. Its  complement,  the  other  half of the  pair,  is the  Korean  proposals
to narrow  that  definition. Behind  this  generic  language,  of course,  are
several  specific  EC actions  against  Korean  exports.
Finding  generic  language  for  specific  restrictions  is an old  and  well-
practiced  skill  among  import  restrictors.  While today's  practitioners  want to
appear  to be writing  rules,  yesterday's  wanted  to appear  to  be obeying  them.
13/  The submission  goes  on to propose  that  the  title  of  code article  3 be
changed  to "Determination  of injury  and  causality"  and  then  moves on in the
text  of the  article  to the  specifics  of examining  causality.
- 26 -Bilateral  tariff  negotiations,  even  before  the  GATT,  were often  subject  to the
most favored  nation  constraint  --  tariff  cuts  had  to be extended  to all
countries,  not  just  to the  one  with which  the  cut  was negotiated. Hence  there
was mercantalist  value in descriptions  of imported  goods  narrow  enough  to
exclude  all  but the  product  variety  imported  from  one  country. Gerard  Curzon
(1965)  offers  an example  from  a German-Swiss  commercial  treaty  of 1904,  in
which  Germany  agreed  to reduce  its  most-favored  nation  tariff  on "large  dapple
mountain  cattle  or  brown  cattle  reared  at a spot  at least  300  meters  above  sea
level  and  having  at least  one  month's  grazing  each  year  at a spot  at least  800
meters  above  sea level"  (60,  fn. 1).  That  was then.  This is  now (from  a
proposed  footnote  to  antidumping  code  article  2.1):
A product  shall  not  be considered  to  have  been introduced  into  the
commerce  of a country  unless  the  product  has  been imported  into
such  country,  or a contract  has  been  made for  the  importation  of
the  product  into  such  country. The fact  that  the  product  has  been
offered  for  sale  in a country,  whether  or not  the  offer  was
irrevocable,  shall  not  be sufficient  for  the  product  to be
considered  to have  been "introduced  into  the  commerce"  of that
country.
The cognoscenti  understand  this footnote  to  mean "E.C.  antidumping
action  against  Korean  fork-lift  trucks."
Would anything  change?
Analysis  requires  simplification,  so let  us begin  by assuming  that  all
of the  proposed  changes  are like  the Swedish  proposal  cited  above  --  proposals
to add  generic  language  that  would  discredit  a specific  antidumping  action.
Then,  we proceed  by asking,  in sequence,  two  questions:
1.  If these  proposed  changes  had  been  on the  books  since  1980
(the  GATT  books  and  the  relevant  national  laws  and  regulations)
- 27 -would they  have  prevented  the  antidumping  actions  that  brought
them forward?
2.  Would "passage"  of these  proposals  now  lift  the  antidumping
actions  for  which  they  front?
The  answer  to the  first  question  is "Nol"  Had  the  clause-by-clause
changes  proposed  at the  Uruguay  Round  been  there  all  the  time,  history  would
not  have  been  different. Multiple  jeopardy,  remember,  is  an integral  part  of
the  system. An exporter  may  be accused  and  investigated  under  an  unlimited
number  of specifications  of each  dimension  of a case  until  the  petitioner
strikes  a specification  that  the  government  agrees  merits  an affirmative
determination. ( If  at first  you  don't  succeed,  try,  try,  again.) Explicitly
outlawing  the technicalities  that  justified  yesterday's  actions  provides
little  assurance  that  yesterday's  cases,  if repeated  tomorrow,  would  not reach
the  same  outcomes. If yesterday's  petitioner  succeeded  on the  thirteenth
iteration,  but  that technicality  had not  existed,  the  lawyers  simply  go on to
the  fourteenth,  and  the fifteenth. They  need find  only  one  accommodating  set
of details  to  win.  Because  multiple  jeopardy  is allowed,  the  respondent
(exporter)  never  wins;  because  of the  specificity  (detail)  of the  system,  the
petitioner  never  runs  out  of options."14
Eliminating  multiple  jeopardy  --  limiting  a  petitioner  to one  try --
would  seem  to be the  key  to  making  the  clause-by-clause  changes  effective.
But the  protectionists  have  managed  to treat epeated  antidumping  cases  as an
indicator  that  repeated  dumping  is  the  problem. There  are  proposals  on the
Uruguay  Round  table  to allow  especially  severe  antidumping  actions  in such
instances,  but  no proposals  to control  recidivist  antidumping.
14/  The  situation  is  even  worse than  this  sentence  makes it  sound.  The  whole
process  is built  on concepts  that  Alf  Rattigan  (1986)  describes  as "principles
without  content,"  E.E.  Schattschneider  (1935)  indicts  as "slogans,  not
formulas."  Thus  the  petitioner  can  make  up alternatives;  he does  not  have to
find  them  in the  details  of the  regulation.
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lift the  antidumping  actions  for  which they  front?  --  the  answer  again  is
"No I"
Enacting  the  generic  words  they  have  proposed  would  be a  minor  victory
for  the  countries  that  wanted  their  exports  out  from  under  existing
antidumping  orders. The  antidumping  orders  would remain  in force. There
would remain  the  need for  GATT lawsuits  to  determine  that  the  specific  actions
were illegal  (assuming  that  GATT  allows  ex post facto  legislation),  then
review  petitions  under  national  antidumping  rules  to have  the antidumping
orders  lifted.
Can  aLr-thing  be  agreed?
It  would  be hard to strike  a balance  between  acceptance  of the  limiting
phrases  the  Swedes,  Koreans,  Japanese  and  others  have  proposed  against  the
expanding  phrases  the  U.S. and  the  E.C.  have  proposed. The  trade-restricting
actions  in the  background  have already  been taken:  the  victims  want these
actions  lifted,  the  perpetrators  want international  sanction  for  them.
Amending  the  GATT code  to include  the limiting  phrases  and the  expanding
phrases  would  give the  U.S. and  the  E.C.  what they  want --  international
sanction  for  their  (most  recent)  unilateral  expansions  of  when GATT  allows
import  restrictions.  But the  countries  that  want the  actions  lifted  would  not
get  what they  want.  Hence  in  any  trading  within  the  "GATT  rules"  negotiating
group,  the  relative  values  of limiting  phrases  and  of expanding  phrases  could
not  be based  on the  trade  restrictions  behind  them.  Limiting  phrases  would
have to trade  at a large  discount  against  expanding  phrases  --  the  discount
relating  to the  delay  and  the expense  of  moving  from  this  first  step  to
lifting  of the  antidumping  orders  and  to the  uncertainty  that  this  first  step
would  ever lead  to their  being  lifted.
A similar  problem  would  complicate  striking  a balance  across  negotiating
groups,  e.g.,  the  U.S.  and the  E.C. accept  limiting  rules  in exchange  for
- 29 -Swedish,  Korean  and  Japanese  tariff  cuts  or non-tariff  barrier  relaxations.
The "limits  acceptance"  half  of the  bargain  would  have to  be heavily
discounted  for  the  uncertainty  that it  will affect  market  access,  and for  the
administrative  expense  and  delay  that  will be involved  even if it does." 1
Why then  do countries  not  trade  directly  in the  restrictions  for  which
the  generic  words are  fronts,  i.e.,  put  the  antidumping  and other  trade
remedies  actions  on the  table  in  the  market  access  negotiations?
A straightforward  answer  is that  doing  so is outside  the  bounds  of the
delegations'  negotiating  authorities.  A second  answer  is  that  doing  things
this  way raises  questions  about  the  permanence  (binding)  of such
liberalizations.  The interests  that  are  protected  might  exploit  the  multiple
jeopardy  property  of the  trade  remedies  to  put everything  back in  place.
And, trading  antidumping  orders  for  tariffs  or NTBs  would  raise
religious  questions  within  the  GATT.  Many  would  argue  that  the  orders  are
illegal  under  the  GATT --  especially  the  negotiated  quantitative  restrictions
that  have superseded  many trade  remedy  actions  --  and  therefore  it  would  be
improper  to trade  legal  actions  for  illegal  ones:  a compromise  of underlying
legal  principles  that  would,  in the  long  run,  be more damaging  than  the
present  restrictions.  But to us this  is  not a compelling  argument.
Antidumping's  underlying  legal  principles  have  been shameful  from  the
beginning,  and  they  have  been further  compromised  many times  over
antidumping's  ninety  year  history.
Although  172  pages  of proposals  were on the  table,  when the  Uruguay
Round's  Secretariat  announced  the  restart  of  negotiations  in  March  1991  they
admitted  that "the  Brussels  document  does  not contain  a text  on antidumping
and  this  is therefore  one  area  in  which  there  is  no  basis  for  negotiations"
15/  This discussion  has failed  to take  into  account  another  important
complicating  factor:  half the  time  a trade  remedy  action  is superseded  by a
negotiated  export  restraint  --  a restraint  that  the  exporter  prefers  to the
trade  remedy  action  that is  just around  the  administrative  corner. This
factor  will be another  source  of discounting  of the  "what"  and  the "when"  of
what Sweden,  Japan  and  Korea  will gain if the  U.S. and  the  E.C.  accept  the
limiting  phrases  the  exporting  countries  have  proposed.
- 30  -(GATT  1991,  5,  emphasis  added).  One  hundred  seventy-two  pages  of clause-by-
clause  proposals,  but  no basis  for  negotiations.
As it is  very difficult  to tell  what the  proposals  tabled  in the
antidumping  negotiations  are  worth --  vis-a-vis  each other  or  vis-&-vis  the
subject  matter  of other  groups  --  this is  no surprise. Flaws  in the  GATT
rules  (enunerated  in section  III  above)  and  the  unwillingness  of the
international  community  to deal  with these  flaws  have rendered  multilateral
negotiations  over these  rules  impotent  to deal  with international  trade
problems.
V.  CONCLUSIONS
As the  process  currently  works,  the  rules  are  made from  the  bottom,  up.
The sequence  of causation  (within  the synergistic  structure  of things)  is as
follows:
1.  Concerns  of domestic  enterprises  to have  protection  from  import
competition.
2. Expansion  of  national  administrative  practice  to accommodate.
3.  Revision  of national  laws  and  regulations  to  validate  the  expanded
administrative  practice.
4.  Expansion  of the international  code to  provide  international  sanction
for  expanded  national  practice.
In short,  national  rules  empower  domestic  import-competing  interests,
international  rules  sanction  national  rules. The  rules  do not  work in the
opposite  direction. The fate  of the  Kennedy  F.ound  antidumping  code shows  that-
detail  that  moves irom  the  center,  out,  is rejected  at the  national  level.
Detail  that  comes  from  the  bottom  --  like  the  expansion  of antidumping  to
include  pricing  below  full  costs  --  gain international  sanction.
The  menu on the  table  at the  Uruguay  Round  is  consistent  with the
history  of antidumping. The  underlying  actions  that  give  meaning  to the  words
- 31 -are, first  of all,  national  responses  to special-interest  pressures  for
protection. The  expansion  of antidumping  to cover  pricing  below  full  cost  is
the  archetype  case,  and  this  case  tells  us that the  latest  rounds  of expansion
of the scope  of  Article  VI's  permission  to restrict  imports  will seize
international  sanction  if the  international  community  does  not give  it
"voluntarily."
The  process  begins  with the  power  of national  sectoral  interests
(pressure  groups)  over  national  governments,  it  continues  with the  power  of
the  restricting  national  governments  over  the  national  governments  whose
exporters  are restricted. The  definition  of fair  imbedded  in the  GATT rules
is the  one  put in at the  beginning  of this  process,  by the  protection-seeking
special  interest.
Things  do not  have to  be this  way.  The power  at the  base
of international  differences  is  not the  power  of one  country  relative  to
another,  it is  the  power  within  each  country  of import-competing  inter.3te
over other  interests. This  power  is  given  to them  by the  national  trade
remedies  rules,  the  GATT  rules  endorse  this  power,  and  in so-doing,  intensify
it.  Making  things  better  depends  on changing  national  trade  remedy  rules  in  a
way that  creates  a countervailing  force,  an offset  to the  already  enfranchised
interests  of import-competing  enterprises. Buyers  of imports  and  of import-
competing  domestic  goods  should  be equally  enfranchised.
VI. REFORM
The  trade  remedies,  led  by antidumping,  have  today  a stronger  momentum
than  the  trade  negotiations.  Displaced  competitors  quickly  bring  any increase
of imports  under  the scrutiny  of antidumping  administrators.  And from  there,
the  odds are  overwhelming  that  formal  restrictions  will be imposed  --  if the
exporter  does  not  agree  to an informal  restraint  before  the  antidumping
process  runs its  course. Antidumping  is  a particularly  insidious  threat  in
- 32 -that  it appears  to  bring  systemic  justification  to the trade  restrictions  it
creates:  it is  as if the  GATT system  were  programmed  to destroy  itself.
Get  antidumping  under  control
Antidumping  is ordinary  protection,  so  reform  must  mean less
antidumping,  not a  new rationale  for  the same  thing. Reform  will not  be found
in the  details  of the  antidumping  code. When the  GATT  worked  to restrict
imports,  it  worked  by providing  a  means  by  which  a government  with the
political  will to control  new restrictions  could  do so.  So,  reform  turns  on
governments  finding  the  political  will to impose  fewer  antidumping
restrictions.6'6  The  next  question,  then,  is  the  obvious  one:  when
governments  have had  the  political  will to restrain  antidumping,  where  did
that  will come from?
The  source  of  political  will
In the  golden  days  of the  GATT,  trade  liberalization  dominated  the
politics  of trade  policy  mainly  through  the  GATT  negotiations  to reduce
tariffs. The  political  will to  resist  trade  remedies  sprang  from  the
political  will that  drove  trade  liberalization.  But  now, the  forces  that
propelled  trade  liberalization  are  weaker  and  the  trade  remedies  have an
identity  and a constituency  all  their  own.  "Fair  and free  trade"  is the
rhetoric  of today  --  trade  liberalization  has  separate,  but  equal  standing
with the  trade  remedies.
As the  trade  remedies  achieved  their  own  momentum,  it  was perhaps
instinctive  to assume  that  as international  negotiations  had been  the  focus  of
trade  liberalization  politics,  international  negotiations  could  be the  focus
of efforts  to restrain  the  trade  remedies. But  it did  not  work.  The  natural
function  of trade  remedies  is to restrict  trade,  and  as things  turned  out,
16/  This is the  point  at  which  discussions  of reform  often  end  --  by passing
the  buck  to "political  will"  as if  the  analyst's  responsibility  ended  just
outside  the  border  of that  concept.
- 33  -international  negotiations  have strengthened  the  natural  momentum  of trade
remedies. The  Tokyo  Round  codes  were followed  by an explosion  of trade
remedies,  not a  reduction. In  Canada  and  Australia,  attempcs  to rein in
antidumping  regulations  were compromised  by protectionist  interests'
references  to agreed  international  standards."i  The  will to resist  has not
been found  then in international  negotiations  or agreements.
A strenuous  will to  resist  has  however  been found,  several  times. The
fertilizer  case in  Australia  spurred  the  Hawke  government  to bring  antidumping
into  line.  (Banks,  1991)  Farmers  were an important  source  of support  for  Prime
Minister  Hawke's  liberalization  of industry  policies,  and  when told to  pay an
antidumping  duty  on fertilizer,  they  fought  back.  Their  resistance  sparked
sufficient  political  will to displace  Australia  from  its  position  as the
world's  champion  antidumper  in  the  mid-1980s;  by 1989,  it had  only  one-tenth
as many antidumping  actions  in  place  as in 1984. And  before  that,  in the
1960s  and  1970s,  the  Australian  Industries  Assistance  Commission's  work to
measure  and  publicize  the  economywide  effects  of protection  had contributed
significantly  to the  Australian  public's  will to support  the  eventual  shift
toward  open,  market-oriented  industrial  policies.
17/ Any number  of conversations  with  well-meaning,  GATT-fearing  trade
officials  also support  the  point. About  the  time  the  Uruguay  Round  began,  one
of the  present  authors  (Finger)  was among  several  World  Bank staff  who  met
with a high  trade  official  of a country  with a long  record  of supporting
international  organizations,  including  the  World  Bank,  and  of supporting  the
interests  of developing  countries.  The  official's  opening  statement  begar.  with
a description  of how the  major  trading  countries  were slipping  into
protectionism  and  ended  with a call  for  a return  to the  GATT  rules.  When it
came  Finger's  turn to speak  he asked  about  a publicized  trade  restriction  that
official's  country  had imposed  a short  time  before.  The  official's  response
was "But  that  was an antidumping  action:  antidumping  actions  are  GATT-legal."
To this,  Finger  replied  that  almost  every  new trade  restriction  was GATT-
legal,  or  better  --  "lor  better"  in the  sense  that  it  was a negotiated
restraint  that  the  exporter  preferred  to the  GATT-legal  restraint  that  was
just  around  the  administrative  corner. The  matter  was discussed  no farther.
Finger  learned  eventually  (when  he was asked  to explain  his  part in the
meeting)  that  the  official  had later  commented  that  the  World  Bank  was anti-
GATT.  The official  seemed  not to  be disingenuous. In his  mind,  trade
restrictions  were bad,  GATT  was good,  and  any statement  associating  the two
was insincere.
- 34  -The  will to resist  has  often  been found  in the  United  States,  most
recently  in the  flat-panel  displays  antidumping  case.  ("Flat-panel  displays"
are screens  for  laptop  computers.)  U.S.  producers  alleged  t:iat  ten  Japanese
companies  were dumping  by  margins  of 71  percent  to 318  percent.  U.S. computer
manufacturers  (buyers  of flat-panel  displays),  led  by Compaq  Computer
Corporation,  vigorously  opposed  the  petition. But  within  the legalities  of
the  investigation,  the  computer  manufacturers  could  not  argue  that the
antidumping  penalty  would raise  their  costs,  cut  into  their  profits,  and force
them to lay  off  workers. The  antidumping  investigation  c.n  take  into  account
only injuries  to the  petitioner's  sales,  profits,  employment,  and  so on.  So
U.S. computer  manufacturers,  with recourse  only  to the technicalities  of the
regulations,  chose  to argue  that  U.S. firms  do not  produce  the  same  type  of
screens  as Japanese  companies. But  past  practice  had  considerably  stretched
the  meaning  of "like  product"  and  the  Commerce  Department  did  not  revert  to a
narrow  interpretation.  Instead,  it followed  the  familiar  pattern  in such
cases:  a ruling  in favor  of the  petitioner,  but at rates  that  would  not  unduly
penalize  U.S. buyers  of the imports  --  zero  on some  imports,  1.46  percent  to
4.6  percent  on others. The  frozen  concentrated  orange  juice  cases  (chapter  6)
reached  a similar  outcome. Faced  with resistance  from  powerful  consumer
product  companies  like  Proctor  and  Gamble  and  Coca  Cola,  the  U.S.  government
returned  an affirmative  determination  but  small  antidumping  rates  (0.48
percent  to 1.96  percent).  Likewise,  on imported  color  TV tubes,  where  U.S.
manufacturers  are  buyers,  the  Commerce  Department  found  a  margin  of 1.91
percent;  on color  TV receivers,  it found  margins  in  the  range  of 15  percent  to
18  percent.
Where  there  has  been the  political  will to resist,  it has sprung  from
the  domestic  costs  of the  proposed  antidumping  restriction  on imports.
- 35 -A suggestion  for change
That the  only  effective  resistance  to  antidumping  actions  in the  1980s
came from  the  domestic  interests  that  bore  their  costs  suggests  that  taking
these  costs  and interests  more effectively  into  account  might  offer  a  way out
of the  antidumping  morass.
Ask the  right  question. Giving  these  domestic  costs  more influence
begins  with recognizing  the  basic  public  choice  function  of the trade
remedies:  they  are  channels  for  managing  domestic  pressures  for  protection.
There  is  nothing  shameful  in that. An antidumping  petition  is a request  for
an action  by a government. Deciding  correctly  whether  to take  or not to take
that  action  begins  with asking  the  right  question. The right  question  is:  Who
In the  domestic  economy  will benefit  from the  proposed  action  and  who  will
lose  --  and by how much? The traditional question --  What are the trade
practices  of foreign  exporters  and  how  do these  practices  affect  producers  of
like  products  in the  domestic  e_onomy?  --  is the  wrong  une.  The  part of the
question  on trade  practices  is irrelevant  while the  other  part is  only  half of
what is  relevant.
Get the  economics  right. The  domestic  economic  costs  of a trade-
restricting  action  are  as substantive  as the  gains.  They  have  never  been  given
legal  substance  because  the  legal  profession  has  never  been  charged  to do so,
not because  it cannot  be done. A domestic  loss  and  a domestic  loser  from  an
impediment  to imports  should  have  the  same  standing  in law  and in
administrative  procedures  as a  gain  or a gainer  --  including  the
administrative  mechanics  to petition  for  removal  of an impediment  to imports
when that  impediment  compromises  his  or her  economic  interests.
The  perspective  that  currently  dominates  such  matters  presumes  that
restrictions  on international  trade  can  be constrained  only  by international
discussion  and  evaluation. Within  this  perspective,  our  suggestion  will sound
like  a formula  for  autarky. It is  not.  Economic  analyses  routinely
demonstrate  that  the  domestic  costs  of import  restrictions  exceed  the  domestic
- 36 -gains.  If the  procedures  for  reaching  decisions  got  the  underlying  domestic
economics  right,  the  decision  in  most instances  would  be against  the  proposed
import  restriction.
This  does  not  mean that  econometric  models  would replace  processes  of
public  inquiry. The  gains  from  protection  have  oni  representation  in
econometric  models  --  in the language  of output  effects,  producer  surpluses,
and so on --  and an equally  substantive  but  different  representation  in the
process  of public  inquiry  --  in the  language  of (avoided)  injury  to competing
domestic  production. The costs  of protection  have a representation  in
econometric models --  buyer effects, efficiency losses, and so on --  but so
far,  not in the  public  inquiry. The technician's  task is to translate  the
concepts  of costs  of protection  into  the  language  of a public  inquiry  --  as
has  already  been done  for  the  concepts  of gains. We will explain  below  that
this is  not  nearly  the technical  challenge  that  it  might  at first  seem.
The  result  might  not only  be better  economics;  but it  might  also  be a
more cooperative  attitude  among  nations. Under  present  arrangements,  a
decision  not to impose  an import  restriction  has  the  a-pearance  of a decision
favoring  the  interests  of another  country  against  domestic  interests.
Building  national  decisions  on better  economics  would  reduce  this source  of
animosity. Lester  Maddox,  governor  of Georgia,  when asked  about  prison  reform
replied,  "If  we want better  prisons  the  first  thing  we need is a better  class
of prisoner."  He should  have  been  appointed  to the  GATT.
The technicalities  of the  suggestion
Our  proposal  would  change  the  focus  of the  investigation  from  the  effect
of the  proposed  restriction  on domestic  producers  of like  or competing  goods
to the  effect  on the  national  economic  interest  of the  restricting  country.
By "national  economic  interest"  we mean the  sum  of the  benefits  to  all
- 37 -natlonals  who benefit  minus  the  costs  to all  nationals  who  lose. 1' "Injury,"
as it is  defined  in trade  remedies  law,  is  one  half  of the  national  economic
interest  --  as explained  above,  usually  the  smaller  half.  Antidumping  would
thus  become  public  policy  rather  than  private  policy.
The  suggestion  does  not imply  that  each  country  replace  its  system  of
enforcement  with somebody  else's. The  key  point  is that  domestic  losses  and
the losers  from import  restrictions  have the  same  standing  in law  and
procedures  as the gains  and  the  gainers. Australian  users  of imports  should
have the  same  entitlement  as  Australian  regulations  and  procedures  already
give  to  Australian  producers  of like  and  competing  products,  EC users  the  same
as EC producers  of like  products,  and  so  on.  Procedures  in each  country  would
retain  their  national  character. In the  United  States,  trade  lawyers  would
organize  the  persons  whose interests  were newly  enfranchised  into  client
groups  that  could  pay the  lawyers  to presert  the  information  that  advanced
their  interests. EC administrators  could  leg4ttimately  spread  their  concerns
to the  interests  of user industries,  demonstrating  to them  as  well as to
import-competing  interests  that  their  interests  were more duly  considered  in
Brussels  than  in national  capitals. National  processes  would  take  interests
into  account  in the  way they  normally  do,  but  eacih  national  process  would  take
more interests  into  account.
Not  a retrofit  to  present  practice. Our  suggestion  is that  the  injury
investigation  be replaced  by a  national  economic  interest  investigation,  not
that  a national  economic  interest  investigation  be retrofitted  to antidumping
cases  as they  are  presently  conducted. Canada  and  the  EC now  have such  public
interest  provisions:  after  an affirmative  determination  is reached  in an
injury  test,  the  administering  agency  may take  the  public  interest  into
18/  The reader  should  note  we are  not  endorsing  the  Canadian,  the  US, or the
EC definition  of "national  ecoaomic  interest." Our suggestion  is for  a
changed  operational  definition  --  the sum  of the  interests  of all  nationals
affected  by the  proposed  trade  remedy,  those  who  will lose  as  well as those
who  will benefit.
- 38 -account.  (EC  regulations  provide  for  consideration  of the  Community  interest,
but  they do  not provide  explicitly  for  investigation  to determine  what it is.)
Such  arrangements  create  a conflict  within  the law:  is the  special
interest  determination  o'-  the injury  investigation  the  basis  for  deciding
whether  to restrict  or  not to restrict  imports,  or is  the  outcome  of the
public  interest  determination  the  basis?  In  Canada  and  in the  EC, regulatory
practice  has resolved  the  conflict  in favor  of the  special  interest. The
United  States  has  no public  interest  provision,  but  when the  user industry  is
powerful,  U.S.  practice  bends  the  law  to take it into  account:  administrators
enforce  smaller  antidumping  margins  when users  press  hard.  Though  this is
another  example  of the  devious  practices  that  characterize  antidumping
regulation,  the result  in these  instances  is  more consistent  with the  national
economic  interest  (as  we define  it)  than  the  result  that  EC or Canadian
practice  delivers.
Substituting  a national  economic  interest  test  for  the  injury  test  would
help to  make  honest  persons  of U.S  antidumping  enforcers. A national  economic
interest  standard  would  mean that  these  interests  could  be the  basis  of a
negative  determination.
National  economic  interest  in  ll.S.  trade  law.  The  concept  of national
economic  interest  is  not  novel;  it  has  been a  part of trade  law  for some  time.
The  words themselves  appear  in the  U.S.  escape  clause:  when the  International
Trade  Commission  returns  an affirmative  injury  determination,  the  president  is
instructed  to  provide  import  relief  unless  he determines  that  doing  so is  not
in the  national  economic  interest  of the  United  States.1 91  National  economic
interest  is not  defined  in  U.S. law,  but its  legislative  history  suggests  that
the  Congress  inserted  it so that  the  president  would  not trade  injury  to  U.S.
producers  for  the  "foreign  policy"  interests  of the  United  States. The  stress
was on "of  the  United  States"  (versus  foreigners). The  definition  of
19/  The  U.S. escape  clause  gives  the  president  a second  alternative,
adjustment  assistance.
- 39 -"national"  already  implicit  in  U.S. trade  law  --  U.S.  producers  of like  or
competing goods --  was not questioned.
Public  interest  provision  in  Canadian  law.  In 1984,  the  Canadian
Parliament  legislated  several  reforms  in Canadian  trade  remedies. One  of
these  reforms  was a response  to complaints  that  Canadian  antidumping
enforcement  focused  too  much on  Canadian  producers  of like  products  (Canadian
corn  growers  in the  grain  corn  case,  say)  and  too  little  on downstream  users
and  consumers  (the  Canadian  feed  industry  or Canadian  poultry,  beef,  and  hog
farmers). In response,  the  Canadian  Parliament  provided  for  a "public
interest"  inquiry  as an additional  part of the  antidumping  process.
But  the  Parliament  did  not specify  --  either  procedurally  or
conceptually  --  what "public  interest"  meant.  In its  first  public  interest
recommmendation,  the  Canadian  International  Trade  Tribunal  concluded  that  the
public  interest  was not  a basis  for  rejecting  the  Canadian  corn  growers'
entitlement  to protection  under  the  antidumping  law,  but that  it  was the  basis
only for  limiting  protection  to the level  to  which the  corn  growers  were
entitled. To determine  that level,  the  Tribunal  fell  back on the  long-lived
"no  injury"  concept,  the familiar  half-economics  of trade  remedies  law.  Only
after  the  Canadian  corn  growers  were completely  free  of the  effects  of import
competition  would  the  interests  of any  other  Canadian  be considered.
The  protection  balance  sheet  of the  Leutwiler  Report.  In 1983,  Mr.
Arthur  Dunkel,  Director-General  of the  GATT,  invited  a group  of seven  eminent
persons  to study  and  report  on  problems  facing  the  international  trading
system. Their  report,  often  referred  to as the  Leutwiler  Report  (GATT  1985),
presented  an idea  similar  to the  national  economic  interest  concept,  which
they  called  the  protection  balance  sheet. But  the  suggestion  lost  ito  impact
when its  authors  made the  popular  mistake  of apologizing  for  the  costs  of
protection  being  "intangible"  while the  benefits  were concrete.  Nonsense.
The  cost of prctection  is  measured  in the  same  dimensions  as the  gains. If
antidumping  action  pushes  up the  price  of frozen  concentrated  orange  juice,
- 40 -the effect  on an orange  juice  processor-distributor's  costs,  profits,  and
employment  will be  measured  the  same  way as the  effects  (in  the  other
direction)  on a Florida  orange  grower. Likewise  for  the  profits  and  jobs lost
in shipping  and  distribution  if imports  of cut  flowers  are  restricted.
Consumer  costs  likewise  can  be converted  into  national  jobs  lost.  Negotiated
export  restraints  on Japanese  cars  in the  early  1980s  caused  U.S. consumers  to
pay  an additional  $7  billion  a year for  the same  volume  of imported  cars.
Since  about  90 percent  of U.S.  consumer  expenditure  is  on domestic  goods  and
services  and 10  percent  on imports,  spending  $7  billion  more for  Japanese  cars
means  spending  $6.3  billion  less  on  U.S.-made  things. At the  average  output
in the  U.S.  economy  of $40,000  per employed  person,  this $6.3  billion  comes  to
157,500  jobs.  In comparison,  jobs saved  in the  U.S. car  industry  by the
import  restraints  are  estimated  at 20,000  to 50,000.2'/  Protection  is not
magic.  Consumers  cannot  spend  $7  billion  more on one  thing  without  spending
$7  billion  less  on something  else.  Paying  more for  the  same  amount  of
something  is a  very bad  way to get  rich.
A  momentum  against  restriction. The  economics  of import  protection  by
mandating  higher  import  prices  --  the  economics  of antidumping  --  is the  same
as the  economics  of the  OPEC  oil  price  increases. Citizens  of oil-importing
countries  found  many  ways to express  the  tangible  and  very specific  effects  of
these  price  increases,  and  many  politically  impelling  ways to express  their
concerns  about  these  effects. But an injury  test  disallows  such  effects  and
hence  disenfranchises  all the  citizens  who are  concerned  about  them.  If, say
in  the  United  States,  the  OPEC  oil-price  increases  had been  handled  as an
antidumping  case,  only  the  U.S.  oil industry  would  have  had a say  in  what U.S.
policy  toward  the  increase  should  be.  Revised  as  we suggest  the  antidumping
process  be revised,  every  iteration  through  it  would  be an opportunity  for
users  of imports  to explai how troublesome  the  proposed  restriction  would  be
20/  The figures  are from  Finger  (1991d).
- 41 ---  not  just  an opportunity  for  those  who  would  gain from  the  restriction  to
explain  how  unfair  and  disruptive  the  foreign  exporters  are.
Economywide  perspective  of the  Australian  Industries  Assistance
Commission. We brought  forward  the comparison  between  antidumping  and the
OPEC  price  increases  to suggest  that if injury  investigations  were replaced  by
national  economic  interest  investigations,  the  process  itself  would help  to
inform  the  public  about  the  costs  of import  restrictions  and  consequently
generate  a  momentum  against  their  expansion. In  Australia,  the Industries
Assistance  Commission's  investigations  of the  economywide  Impact  of Australian
protection  played  this  role.  The  change  began,  however,  with an instinct  for
good  government,  not an instinct  for  good  economics. Alf  Rattigan,  who led
the  Australian  government  to change  the  way it evaluated  the  impact  of
protection,  was a good-government  man and  from  that  he became  a good-economics
man.  The  initial  change  was built  on the  earlier  Tariff  Board'e  mandate  to
advise  on proposed  tariff  changes. When  Rattigan  took  seriously  the  Tariff
Board's  mandate  to conduct  public  inquiries  and  provide  public  information,
"economywide  perspective"  economics  evolved  more or less  naturally  from  his
sense  of good  government. Later,  the  economywide  perspective  economics  was
made explicit  in the  Industries  Assistance  Commission's  charter.
The  Australian  experience  shows  that  good  economics  and  good  government
can  be complements  --  even  when the issue  is trade  policy. But  Australian
experience  does  not suggest  that  the  transition  to either  will be easy.
Industries  that  had  built  their  entitlement  to protection  on the  half-
economics  of the  Tariff  Board's  "economic  and  efficient  production"  evaluation
of how  much  protection  a petitioning  industry  "needed"  realized  quickly  the
impact  that information  on the  other  half  of the  economics  would  have.  Bill
Carmichael,  Rattigan's  chief-of-staff  for  twelve  years,  was, like  Rattigan,  a
good-government  man first  and  derivatively  a good-economics  man.  Carmichael
had  a master's  instinct  for  recruiting  and  inspiring  good  staff  who in turn
produced  sound  economic  analysis  that  would  withstand  the  political  heat.
- 42 -More than  that,  Carmichael  was tirelessly  aggressive  at getting  this  "dirt"
into  the  hands  of politicians  who would  use it  mercilessly. (If  your  place  at
the  political  trough  depends  on the  public  not  knowing  half the  economics  of
whav is going  on,  then to  you information  on that  other  half is  political
dirt.)  There  comes  to  mind a saying  of former  U.S. President  Harry S.  Truman:
"I  never  give  the  opposition  hell.  I just  tell  the  truth  on them and  think  it
is  hell."  The  good  guys  knew  how to  play  hard-ball  too. More than that,
these  good  guys  had  the  courage  to try  to  make things  better.
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